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RECENT STATUTES
INCHOATE DOWER-RIGHT OF EXTINGUISHENT.-In 1930, the New York Legis-
lature abolished the dower right of wives to take one-third of the income of their
deceased husbands' real property where the marriage was contracted after September
1, 1930, or where the husband became seized of the property after that date.1
However, the statute left wholly unimpaired the so-called inchoate right of dower,
for it did not affect the right of a wife, married before September 1, 1930, whose
husband was living after that date, and had acquired realty before that time, to
receive upon his death her one-third share.
By failing to include such inchoate dower in the statute, the legislature left in
existence a right which, because it was an incumbrance on land, made it difficult for
a husband to alienate his real property. It was, therefore, a logical step to remedy
the situation by enacting a new statute2 which provides that after February 14, 1938,
an owner of land may apply to the Supreme Court to have extinguished any inchoate
right of dower to which his land is subject.8
Inchoate dower is an ancient right which has always found a vigorous champion
and assiduous protector in the courts and jurists of England and America. As long
ago as 1626, Lord Bacon wrote that there were three things which the law favored:
life, liberty, and dower.4 In this country, Gardiner, J., speaking for the court in
Moore v. City of New York5 said "Dower is ...a positive institution of the state,
founded upon public policy." It may be added that courts and jurists have not
been alone in their reluctance to interfere with the inchoate right of dower. An
1. N Y. REAL, PROP. LAW (1929) § 190. This section abolished a wife's dower rights in
the future, but at the same time the legislature passed N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAw (1929) §§ 82-
83. Under dower, the wife could get only a one-third life estate in her deceased spouse's
real property; under this new section of the Decedents' Estate Law she may get as much
as a one-half interest in both realty and personalty. The statutory attack upon dower was,
consequently, effectively counter-balanced. The effect of the changes was not to lessen,
but to enlarge, the property rights of the wife in her deceased husband's estate.
For a good discussion of inchoate dower see NVALsH, LAW OF REAL PROPRTY (1915) 175,
and on the history and probable origin of dower see DIGBY, HISTORY cr THE LAW or REAL
PaoPERY (5th ed. 1897) 127.
2. "An owner of land subject to an inchoate right of dower may maintain an action In
the Supreme Court against the possessor of such right to have the right extinguished. In
such action the court shall find the present cash value of the inchoate right of dower
according to the law applicable to annuities and survivorships. It shall also determine
whether the payment to the defendant of the sum found, in lieu of her right, would be
unduly prejudicial to her. If the court determines that such payment would not be unduly
prejudicial, the court, upon proof of payment of such sum to the defendant or upon pay-
ment into court for her credit, shall make an order declaring the inchoate right of dower
extinguished.
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect section one thousand and fifty-
three, section one thousand and fifty-four, or sections one thousand three hundred and
eighty-eight to one thousand four hundred and nine inclusive, of the Civil Practice Act,
or section two hundred and forty-eight of the Surrogate's Court Act." N. Y. REAL. Par.
LAW (1937) § 190 a.
3. The above law was recommended by the Law Revision Commission and was accom-
panied by elaborate treatment of the reasons prompting the same. See N. Y. Lxois. Doc.
(1938) 65 (L).
4. BAcoN, LAW TRACTS. 331.
5. 8 N. Y. 110, 113 (1853).
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aversion to tampering with it has been reflected in the acts of legislatures. For
example, in only three instances has the New York Legislature allowed the inchoate
right to be destroyed upon the suit of an individual,0 without the consent of the
wife, viz: (1) in a partition action when the property of co-tenants cannot be physi-
cally divided and it is necessary that it be sold, the court may extinguish the
inchoate right of a co-tenant's wife,7 and must direct that a portion of the proceeds
received by her husband be set aside to await the consummation of the inchoate
dower right; (2) when the wife is an infant or incompetent, the right may in cer-
tain instancess be extinguished and part of the proceeds may be set aside in the same
manner as in a partition action;9 (3) when the property of a deceased must be sold
in order to facilitate the settlement of the estate, the inchoate right attached to
such property may be extinguished and a portion of the proceeds set aside in the
same fashion. 0
Naturally, many cases arose which did not fall within any of these three categories.
Then, the fact that a wife could not be forced to sell her inchoate right of dower
often worked a great hardship upon those who dealt with the husband. Mortgagees,
for example, whose mortgages were executed after the marriage of the husband-
mortgagor, could not by foreclosure and sale extinguish the wife's right;" trustees
in bankruptcy or assignees for the benefit of creditors were forced to take the
bankrupt husband's real property subject to his wife's interest; 12 grantees of the hus-
band's property were in no better position;' 3 and judgment creditors who sought
to satisfy their debts by a sale of such real property were powerless to extinguish
the wife's inchoate right.
14
As was pointed out by the sponsors of the new statute,1 it would seem that
in these cases the judgment creditors constitute the group which suffers the greatest
hardship. This fact is exemplified by comparing the position of a judgment creditor
with that of a grantee or mortgagee. In the case of a grantee or mortgagee, both
must acquire their claims against the husband after his marriage or his real property
will not, as to them, be subject to his wife's inchoate dower. They, therefore, have
an opportunity to learn of such incumbrance on the property before they con-
tract. gut a judgment creditor may have advanced credit to an unmarried debtor
solely on the strength of the latter's ownership of real property. Yet, when the
6. Under its power of eminent domain the state may destroy inchoate dower. In Re
Cropsey Ave., 268 N. Y. 183, 197 N. E. 189 (1935). (1935) 4 FonDmr L. Rnv. 504.
7. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr (1920) §§ 1051, 1053. Computation of the portion of the
proceeds to be set aside for the wife is based on the law applicable to annuities and sur-
vivorships.
s. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr (1920) §§ 1385, 1383. These instances are: (a) where the
.e is mortgagee or trustee of property; (b) where she has entered into a valid contract
for conveyance of the property; (c) where her personal property is insufficient to pay her
debts; (d) where her interest xwill be substantially promoted by such disposition.
9. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1920) § 1409 provides for the method by which the wife's
share of the proceeds is to be handled.
10. N. Y. SuRa. CT. Acr. (1920) § 248. It is to be noted that the new amendment
expressly preserves these three rights of action. N. Y. Rrnr Pnop. IAv (1937) § 190 a.
11. Sherod v. Ewell, 104 Iowa 253, 73 N. W. 493 (1897); Anderson v. MkcNeey, 120
App. Div. 676, 105 N. Y. Supp. 278 (3d Dep't 1907).
12. In re Acretelli, 173 Fed. 121 (S. D. N. Y. 1909) (wife must consnt to extin-
guishment of inchoate right).
13. Mfflls v. Ritter, 197 Pa. 353, 47 At. 194 (1900).
14. Harrison v. Eldridge, 7 N. J. L. 392 (1301); House v. Jackson, 50 N. Y. 161 (1872).
For a good discussion of this problem see (1925) 12 VA. L. Riv. 166.
15. N. Y. LFcois. Doe. (1933) 65 (L).
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creditor later attempts to satisfy a judgment based upon the debt, which was
contracted when the debtor was unmarried, he may find that because of the
debtor's intervening marriage such real property, which is now subject to inchoate
dower, will bring an amount less than that of the judgment debt. For instance,
if at a sheriff's sale a judgment creditor bids in the debtor's property for the
amount of the debt (as is usually the case), he must resell it in order to obtain
liquid assets. However, the property, which is now subject to the inchoate dower
of the debtor's wife, may, therefore, bring far less than the amount of the original
debt.16 Under the new statute, however, when real property is sold for the benefit
of judgment creditors, mortgagees, trustees or any lienors, the burden of inchoate
dower will not depress its price to such an extent. The reason is that anyone who
purchases at such a sale, or for that matter any "owner", 17 may, under the present
statute, bring an action in the Supreme Court to have the wife's inchoate right
extinguished. True, payment must be made to the wife for such extinguishment;
but such an amount can be computed in advance, and a purchaser is acquiring land
more readily resaleable than when he buys land subject to inchoate dower. He is
therefore willing to offer a higher price for such land.
The statute provides that the amount of the payment to be made to the wife for
the termination of her inchoate fight is to be computed by the court according to the
law of annuities and survivorship.18 Such present value of an inchoate right is still
determined' 9 according to a rule laid down by Chancellor Walworth as long ago as
1839.20 As soon as such an amount is paid to the wife or into a court for her, the
court will declare the inchoate right extinguished, and the land may thereafter
be sold free from any possibility of an incumbrance. 21
If should be noted that this new statute provides for an immediate cash pay-
ment to the wife and that title to this sum vests in her at once.22 In former
16. Usually the sale of real property which is subject to an inchoate right of dower
will bring far less that its true value minus the value of the inchoate right. Buyers are
reluctant to purchase property in which any interest, however contingent, might subse-
quently ripen into a present estate.
17. See note 2, supra. An accompanying note attached to the Recommendation of the
Law Revision Commission to the Legislature reads: "The preservation of inchoate dower
rights attaching prior to September 1, 1930, has continued to hinder the disposition of
property, to the detriment of owners of property, their purchasers and execution creditors.
The object of this amendment is to provide a method whereby the owner of land may
extinguish an inchoate dower interest by paying to the possessor thereof its present cash
value, provided the court finds that such payment, in lieu of dower, would not be unduly
prejudicial to such possessor."
It might be argued that the term "owner" used in the statute is limited to a husband
who desires to extinguish the inchoate dower right of his wife because the present amend-
ment forms a new sub-section of Section 190 of the Real Property Law, wherein the relation
of husband and wife alone is mentioned. This argument seems to be untenable, however,
in view of the fact that the announced purpose of the statute was to relieve a situation which
was detrimental to "owners of property, their purchasers and execution creditors". N. Y.
L. J. Feb. 19, 1938, p. 1, col. 4.
18. See note 2, supra.
19. See note 2, supra.
20. Its value is the difference between the present value of an annuity, equal to a one-
third interest in the proceeds of the property payable during the expectancy of the wife and
the present value of such an annuity payable during the joint lives of both husband and
wife. Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Page 386, 408 (N. Y. 1839); (1925) 12 VA. L. Rv. 166,
169.
21. See note 2, supra.
22. See note 2, supra.
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instances when the law allowed extinguishment of the inchoate right of dower, it
was provided merely that the fund might be set aside for her, she to have no
interest therein or benefit therefrom until she had survived her husband.P By the
new statute those statutes which authorize the former mode of payment are not
to be affected in any way.
2 4
It is of interest that the statutes which allowed extinguishment of inchoate dower
in cases of partition, incompetency of wife, or settlement of decedents' estates,
provided that the mode of payment to the wife was left to the discretion of the
court.2 5 Throughout the entire transaction the court must exercise complete
control over the method of settlement of the wife's right of dower and could order
her share "to be invested, secured or paid over in such manner as it deems calculated
to protect the rights and interests of the parties."2 0  Under the new statute, how-
ever, the court has no such discretion, but is compelled to order the inchoate dower
right extinguished upon proof of payment to the wife or upon payment into court
for her credit.2 7 The language of the statute places the option as to the mode of
payment upon the owner of the land and not upon the court. It may be that the
legislature has gone too far in thus removing the court's control over the method
of payment to the wife. Is it not possible that in the event of a direct payment to
her (which under the new statute the court could not prevent), the husband might
cajole her into giving him partial or absolute control over the fund? Or that lacking
business sagacity, as many women do, her funds be frittered away on unsound
ventures? In such case the entire proceeds of the land might be dissipated. With
both the land and the proceeds therefrom alienated by him, there would be a com-
plete circumvention of the whole purpose of dower-namely, economic security for
the wife. It is possible that the legislature in its zeal to perfect the alienability of
land has unthinkingly opened the way for the working of hardship upon the wife.
It is unlikely that the new section will be successfully attacked on constitutional
grounds. However, the case of Lawretce v. Miller28 decided in 1849, intimated by
way of dictum that a statute which forced a wife to sell her inchoate right of dower,
which had already attached to land, would be unconstitutional. The theory of this
dictum was that inchoate dower was a right acquired by the marriage contract, and
that such a statute would violate Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution
which forbids the impairment of the obligation of contracts by any state. However,
it has since been decided by the United States Supreme Court that marriage is a
contract which is not within the prohibition of that section of the Constitution.P
Belief in the impregnability of this statute to constitutional attack is strengthened
by a comparison with foreign statutes which have not been declared unconstitu-
tional.80o The Legislature of Minnesota enacted a statute abolishing all inchoate
23. In re Cropsey Ave, 268 N. Y. 183, 197 N. E. 189 (1935) (eminent domain); X. Y.
CIv. PRAc. Acr (1920) § 1053 (action for partition); N. Y. Crv. Pmc. Acr (1920) § 1409
(wife is infant or incompetent); N. Y. SuRR. CT. Acr (1920) § 248 (sale of decedent's
estate).
24. See note 2, supra.
25. See notes 5, 6, 7, and 8, supra.
26. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1920) § 1053.
27. See note 2, supra.
28. Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N. Y. 244, 249 (1849). But see Mloore v. City of New
York, 8 N. Y. 110 (1853) which in effect overrules the argument advanced by Lawrence
v. Miller, supra, in holding that legislation may provide that inchoate dower in land taken
by eminent domain be extinguished.
29. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1837).
30. The Report of the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of Estates, N. Y.
Legis. Doc. (192S) 70, pp. 69-71, discusses the constitutionality of such a statute.
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dower,31 past and future, without compensation; and other states have statutes
similar to New York providing for extinguishment with compensation.82
As New York Real Property Law Section 190 prevents any right of dower from
arising from future marriages, the problem of inchoate dower is limited to the cases
of persons who now possess such rights. Nevertheless the new statute fills a present,
though diminishing, need in providing a means for expediting the alienation of
property which, for a time, will be subject to inchoate dower.
WOILKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RIGHTS OF ACTION OF EMPLOYEES AGAINST TiRe
PERSONS AND SUBROGATION THERET.-The right of an injured workman to receive
compensation from his employer for injuries sustained in the course of his employ-
ment, even though the employer has not been at fault is well settled in Compensa-
tion Law. However, his legal status when injured by a third person has been subject
to many modifications in New York. A recent amendment to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law' has made important changes in regard to the employees' rights against
third party tort-feasors. To understand these additions, it is helpful to consider
briefly the last several amendments to Section 29, which deals with employees' rights
against third party wrongdoers.
Prior to 1935 an employee who was injured in the course of his employment
through the negligence of a third party was compelled to elect between taking com-
pensation and suing the wrongdoer.2 He could not do both. Generally, in the hour
of want and sickness, he elected compensation rather than the chance of recovery
from the third person. So while the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the various
states have never completely destroyed the workman's common law right of action
against a third party wrongdoer,3 nevertheless, as a practical matter, the workman
in New York was reluctant to exercise his right from the force of economic cir-
cumstances. It was the rare case in which the workman could afford to wait for the
court to give him judgment and forego compensation. If the employee chose to
take compensation his common law right of action against the third party was
assigned by operation of law to the insurance company which had paid the compensa-
tion to the injured employee.4 The insurance company might then sue the third party
and possibly collect a sum many times in excess of that which the carrier had paid
to the injured workman in compensation benefits. As the insurance company kept
the entire proceeds of such recovery from the third party tort-feasor,5 it would
often be unduly enriched and the workman would be deprived of his just benefits.
Some small part of the injustice to the workman was eliminated in 19356 when
Section 29 was amended to provide that where the insurance company, as assignee
of the employees' common law right of action against the third party, recovered a
sum in excess of the compensation paid, and other expenses, such excess was divided
31. MwN,. STAT. (Mason, 1937) § 8622-1.
32. N. J. Comp. STAT. (1911) § 25 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 4100.
1. N. Y. WORKmEN'S COmP. LAW § 29, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 684.
2. Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law has been amended many times
without changing the necessity of the workman's election to take compensation or to sue
the third party tort-feasor. N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 615; N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 499; N. Y.
Laws 1934, c. 695; N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 328.
3. Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85 N. J. L. 432, 91 At. 91 (1914); see Miller v. N. Y.
Ry., 171 App. Div. 316, 318, 159 N. Y. Supp. 200, 201 (2d Dep't 1916).
4. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E. 377 (1925).
5. Ibid.
5. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 328.
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so as to give the insurance company one third of such excess and the injured em-
ployee two thirds. This progressive step brought the New York law in 1935 almost
in line with the 1913 fassachusettsr concept of the workmen's rights in a similar case.
If the workman elected to take compensation, thereby transferring his right of
action against the third party to the insurance company, the employee could not
prevent a compromise or settlement by the insurer notwithstanding the fact that he
had a two thirds interest in the proceeds of any recovery. In view of this fact, a
possibility existed that the employee would be deprived of substantial rights. Since
the insurance company was still the assignee of the workman's right of action, and as
such, its primary purpose was recovering what it had paid out in compensation, it
often compromised the suit brought against the tort-feasor, for any amount which
would make it whole, rather than to proceed with the suit for the benefit of the
injured workman. There was also the possibility that the assignee-insurer had
insured the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Law and also had insured
the third party wrongdoer against loss resulting from ordinary public liability. In
such a situation it could hardly be expected that the insurance company would sue
itself for the benefit of the injured workman. Instead, the insurer could drop all
legal action to the exclusion of the employee's rights and deprive him of any chance
of receiving two thirds of whatever proceeds may have been realized from an action
against the third party tort-feasor.
These injustices to the employee have been substantially, though not totally, cured
by the recent changes in Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Lav. 8  An
injured workman is no longer forced to make an election, to sue in case of a third
party action. The workman who is entitled to compensation receives it immediately.
Then, within six months after receiving a compensation award but not later than
one year from the time his right of action accrues, the workman, in his individual
capacity, has the right to sue the third party responsible for his injuries, employ-
ing an attorney of his own selection. The insurance company which has in the
interim been paying him compensation benefits is given a Hen against the proceeds
of that common law action to the extent of all compensation that the workman has
received. In other words, the acceptance by the workman of compensation in the
period of his greatest need, that is, immediately after his injury, does not bar his
right to pursue his remedy against the third party wrongdoer. The workman will
receive the full proceeds of his recovery less the insurance company's lien for com-
pensation paid. His rights no longer will be prejudiced by the possibility of the
insurance carrier's compromising a suit for its own benefit. Theoretically, at least,
the third party action will be prosecuted in the best interests of the workman as
there will be no need for the workman to forego his action because of his immediate
need for financial assistance.
In case the workman fails to bring suit within the time limited for such action, the
insurer who has paid compensation to the injured employee is protected by the
assignment to it by law, of the workman's common law right of action, with the
provision that the workman is to receive two thirds of any recovery in excess of
the compensation paid. In such a case the rights of the workman and the insurance
carrier remain unchanged by the recent amendment to Section 29.
7. A.Lss. A.Nx. LMws (1936) c. 152, § 15, which provides that the workman was to
receive 4/5 of any excess over the amount paid out in compensation. Hall v. Henry
Thayer & Co., 225 Mass. 151, 113 N. E. 644 (1916). New Jersey originally pmitted a
double 'recovery by the injured workman againt both the third party and the insurer.
Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85 N. J. L. 432, 91 At!. 91 (1914). Since 1913, however, the
insurance carrier is subrogated to the workman for the amount paid out in compensation.
N. J. Acts 1913, c. 174, § 8.
8. See note 1, supra.
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The statute as amended makes no change in the provision for deficiency compen-
sation in cases where recovery in a third party action is less than the sum which
would be paid to the workman in a compensation award. The rule is still that
the workman may recover the difference between his compensation award and his
verdict from the insurance company. However, if the workman compromises the
action against the tort-feasor without the consent of the insurance carrier, he loses
his right to recover the deficiency between the amount of the verdict and the amount
which would have been paid to him under a compensation award.0
While the workman's rights are better protected now than before the present
change in the law, the insurance carrier is not protected in any way against the
possibility that the workman, who has brought his action within the time limited,
might after the insurer has paid a definite sum in compensation to the workman,
compromise his action without the consent of the insurance company for less than
the sum paid in compensation. It is, of course, true that if the workman had no
bona fide cause of action, the insurance company would have had none under the
former statute. While there is little reason why a workman would compromise a
good cause of action for less than its value, it has been done. When it is done,
the insurance company, although damaged by the tort-feasor's negligence to the
extent of the compensation paid. and, therefore, having a substantial right, receives
little protection from this law.' 0
It may also be pointed out that under the present law the insurance company
may be damaged by its inability to join as a party plaintiff with the workman, where
the workman, through a choice of an incompetent attorney or otherwise, fails to
prosecute his cause of action to his full advantage.
In view of the many changes made in Section 29 in recent years, it would appear
that the present amendment is merely one step forward towards a more just definition
of the workman's and the insurance company's rights in third party actions. Yet these
rights could be better defined and better protected by a further change in the law.
It is submitted that the law should be further amended to provide that the work-
man and the insurance company have separate causes of action11 against the third
party tort-feasor, with provision for their joinder as parties plaintiff to prevent the
tort-feasor's being subject to double recovery. Such separate cause of action of one
would not be affected by any compromise or settlement of his claim by the other. 12
9. Roth v. Harlem Funeral Car Co., 268 N. Y. 661, 198 N. E. 545 (1935)
10. An attorney who has a lien on the 'recovery of a cause of action may recover from
the defendant if a compromise is effected and the plaintiff secured from the defendant
a sum insufficient to pay the attorney's fee. N. Y. Laws, 1879, c. 542, § 66.
Analogously it would seem that the insurer should recover from the tort-feasor when the
workman's compromise is less than the compensation paid. But the question Is not
settled either in cases or this new statute.
11. Come. GEN. STAr. (1930) § 5231 provides for separate causes of action in- case of
a suit against a third party tort-feasor. In New York under Section 29 of the Workmen's
Compensation Law the insurance carrier has a separate and distinct cause of action in a
death action against the tort-feasor for payments made to the Treasurer of the State of
New York under Section 15, subdivisions 8 and 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
This is true in spite of the fact the wrongdoer has already paid a sum greater than com-
pensation would have been for the death of the employee and has obtained a general
release. Phoenix Ind. Co. v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. 251 N. Y. 127, 167 N. E.
194 (1929); Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Ind. Co., 281 U. S. 98 (1930).
12. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 77, § 671 provides that the insurance carrier be
subrogated to the rights of the injured employee only to the extent of the compensation
paid. Under this statute it has been held if the workman has recovered on or compromised
his cause of action against the tort-feasor, who was notified that compensation had been
[Vol. 7
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The workman should receive compensation during the period of his greatest need
and be allowed to proceed with his third party action in any way he sees fit,
the insurance company having no interest other than a separate cause of action
for damages it has sustained in form of compensation paid because of the tort-
feasor's negligence.
paid, the insurance carrier may still sue the tort-feasor unless he had lost his right by
laches and the recovery by the employee is no bar to such action. Smith v. Yellow Cab
Co., 288 Pa. 85, 135 Atl. 858 (1927). Comz. Gmi. STA. (1930) § 5231 provides: "No
compromise with such third person by either employer or employee shall be binding upon
or affect the lights of the other, unless assented to by him."
